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FISCAL EFFECTS OF A ONE-PERCENT PROPERTY TAX CAP 
ON MAINE MUNICIPALITIES AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
On November 2, 2004, Maine residents will vote on whether to “limit property taxes to 
1% of the assessed value of the property.” This report looks at the effects of the property 
tax cap if it had existed in 2003. Impacts shown in the report are based on the tax cap 
plan as written, which values property at what it was worth in 1996.  
 
We find that Maine towns would have had a shared budget deficit of $687.7 million if the 
tax cap had existed in 2003. Towns would have lost $50.9 million, or 31.9%, of the taxes 
paid by vacation homeowners. These impacts would have been lower if the School 
Finance and Tax Reform Act of 2003 (passed by the voters in June 2004) had been in 
effect. That Act requires the state to pay 55% of local education costs. In that case, the 
shared deficit of Maine towns under the tax cap would drop from $687.7 million to 
$535.2 million. 
 
If the tax cap had existed last year, the average tax rate for residential real estate would 
have dropped from 1.53% to 1.11%. This is more than 1% because the tax cap would 
allow towns to collect extra taxes for voter-approved debt. Across the state, the tax rate 
for homeowners would have gone down in 391 towns. It would have gone up in 81 towns 
because of changes in the way homes are valued for taxes. This means that some people 
in these towns, butno  everyone, would have paid higher taxes if the tax cap had existed 
last year. People who bought homes in recent years would pay higher taxes, while people 
who have lived in their homes for several years would pay lower taxes. 
 
In 2003, Maine towns spent about $2.16 billion on services such as education, law 
enforcement, road maintenance, and libraries. If towns had used all of the additional state 
school funding to decrease spending, the tax cap would have cut local spending to $1.32 
billion. This would have meant cuts of 69.4% in all services other than education, debt 
payments and county taxes.  
 
The state could give towns money to replace lost revenue. To do so, it could raise income 
or sales taxes. To collect $687.7 million, the state would have to raise income taxes by 
64.2%. For a family with income between $35,650 and $45,124, this would mean about 
$652 more in income taxes. The state could instead raise sales and use taxes by 80.2%. 
This would raise the sales tax rate from 5% to just over 9%. 
 
A property tax cap in Maine could have broad effects. If towns rely on the state for 
money, then they could lose some control of local services. Changing the way services 
are paid for would shift taxes away from some property owners, residents, and businesses 
and onto others.  A tax cap could also affect land use and property values.  
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FISCAL EFFECTS OF A ONE-PERCENT PROPERTY TAX CAP 
ON MAINE MUNICIPALITIES AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
On November 2, 2004, Maine residents will vote on a statwide ci izen initiative that 
would “limit property taxes to 1% of the assessed value of the property.”  The Maine 
Taxpayers Action Network proposed this referendum, titled “An Act to Impose Limits on 
Real and Personal Property Taxes.”  Proponents of the measure point to the benefits of 
reduced local property taxes.  Town officials and others opposed to the initiative suggest 
it will lead to dramatic cuts in local public services.  Opponents also argue that it would 
reduce local control, as some services would likely become centralized or provided by the 
state government. 
 
If approved by Maine voters, the initiative would place a one-percent cap on the local 
property tax rate.  The plan also would set property valuations at the 1996-1997 “full-
cash value” ofreal and personal property.  In an April 16, 2004 Maine Supreme Court 
Opinion provided to the Legislature, four Justices opined that this “roll-back” provision is 
unconstitutional and three Justices declined to offer an opinion on constitutionality 
finding it preferable for this to be determined in a fully litigated case (Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court, 2004).  Our analysis, therefore, does not assume unconstitutionality of this 
provision of the tax cap proposal. 
 
This report presents information on the fiscal effects of the property tax cap, if it had 
been in effect in 2003, on Maine municipalities and the state government.  We use the 
most currently available data from Maine Revenue Services, the U.S. Census Bureau, the 
Maine Department of Education, the Maine Office of Fiscal and Program Review, and 
the Maine Municipal Association (MMA).  Impacts presented in the report are based on 
the tax cap initiative as written, which sets property valuations at 1996-1997 full-cash 
values.  This is done to provide, as close as possible, the impacts of the actual referendum 
included on the ballot.  If the courts disallow the valuation method put forth in the 
referendum, the impacts can be expected to differ from those presented. 
 
Seven questions about the impacts of the proposed property tax cap motivate the research 
presented in this report.  Answers to these questions are summarized below: 
 
1. What types of fiscal impacts would Maine municipalities face as a result of the 
tax cap? 
 
Maine municipalities would have experienced a combined fiscal deficit of $687.7 million 
if the property tax cap had been in effect in 2003.  The combined deficit in the 15 largest 
municipalities would have been $243.1 million, which is about 35 percent of the total 
property tax revenue loss acro s all municipalities included in the study. 
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2. What would happen to local property tax rates? 
 
The average full-state value tax rate for residential real estate would have decreased from 
1.53 percent to 1.11 percent if the tax cap had been in effect in 2003.  The average post-
initiative tax rate of 1.11 percent exceeds one percent because the tax cap proposal allows 
municipalities to raise taxes, above the one-percent limit, to cover pre-existing voter-
approved debt.   
 
The full-state value tax rate for residential real estate would decrease under the property 
tax cap in 391 municipalities.  On the other hand, the full-state value tax rate for 
residential real estate would increase under the property tax cap in 81 municipalities.  The 
average individual in these municipalities who purchased or built a home around 2003 
would pay higher taxes under the property tax cap.  The average individual who 
purchased or built a home prior to 2003 would pay lower taxes if the increase in value, 
between the year the home was purchased or built and 2003, more than offsets the 
increase in the tax rate.
 
Although it may seem counterintuitive that the amount of taxes paid by some individuals 
would increase under the property tax cap, the explanation is relatively straightforward.  
In some Maine municipalities, the amount of taxes collected would not change (or would 
decrease only slightly) under the property tax cap.  The tax cap proposal, however, sets 
property valuations at the 1996-19 7 “full-cash value” of real and personal property.  
Thus, individuals who purchased or built homes in the years prior to, or just after, 1996 
would pay lower taxes under the property tax cap.  In order for the total amount of taxes 
collected to remain unchanged, these reductions must be off et by increases in taxes paid 
by individuals who purchased or built homes in later years.  Some Maine businesses 
would pay higher taxes under the property tax cap as well.
 
 
3. How much property tax revenue would municipalities lose from vacation 
homeowners? 
 
Maine municipalities would lose $50.9 million, or 31.9 percent, of the property taxes paid 
by vacation homeowners under the property tax cap. 
 
 
4. How would additional state spending on local education influence the potential 
impacts of the property tax cap? 
 
Incorporating the additional school funding that MMA predicts municipalities would 
receive from the state government, we find that the estimated fiscal deficits under the 
property tax cap would decrease from $687.7 million to $535.2 million. 
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5. How would the tax cap revenue impacts compare to current local and state 
government spending levels? 
 
Maine municipalities spent an estimated $2.16 billion on public services in 2003, 
including $991.2 million in local spending on education and over $100 million each on 
general administration, law enforcement and road maintenance.  Assuming that 
municipalities use 100 percent of the additional state school funding to decrease local 
expenditures on education, we estimate that total municipal expenditures would have 
decreased to $1.32 billion if the tax cap had been in effect in 2003.  Spending on general 
administration, law enforcement and road maintenance would have decreased from over 
$100 million in each category to less than $50 million in each category under he 
property tax cap.  Cuts made to expenditure areas other than local education, debt 
payments and county taxes represent a 69.4 percent reduction from spending levels 
without the property tax cap.   
 
State appropriations total $5.22 billion over the two-year budget for FY 04-05.  
Assuming that state revenues are fixed and municipalities use 100 percent of the 
additional state school funding to decrease local expenditures on education, we estimate 
that it would require 20.5 percent of the total state budget to help municipalities 
overcome the effects of the property tax cap. 
 
 
6. What types of increases in state income and sales taxes could offset the local 
revenue lost from the property tax cap? 
 
The state could make up for the revenue lost under the prop ty tax cap by either 
increasing state income or sales taxes, or some combination of the two.  In order for the 
state to collect $687.7 million in additional revenue to transfer to municipal governments, 
it would need to increase the amount of revenue collected through income taxes by 64.2 
percent.  For a family with a household income of between $35,650 and $45,124, this 
amounts to an additional $652 in state income taxes.  On the other hand, the state would 
need to increase the amount received through sales and use taxes by 80.2 percent in order 
to increase collections by $687.7 million.  This would increase the state sales tax rate 
from 5 percent to slightly over 9 percent. 
 
 
7. What long-term effects would a property tax cap have on Maine municipalities 
and the state government? 
 
A property tax cap in Maine could have impacts beyond the straightforward reduction of 
one type of tax.  Changing local tax structures could shift the tax burden away from some 
property owners, taxpayers, and businesses and onto others; could shift control of local 
revenues and expenditures from one level of government to another; could force 
communities to raise other fees; and could affect land use and property values.
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FISCAL EFFECTS OF A ONE-PERCENT PROPERTY TAX CAP 
ON MAINE MUNICIPALITIES AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On November 2, 2004, Maine residents will vote on a statewide citizen initiative that 
would “limit property taxes to 1% of the assessed valu  of the property.”  The Maine 
Taxpayers Action Network proposed this referendum, titled “An Act to Impose Limits on 
Real and Personal Property Taxes.”  Proponents of the measure point to the benefits of 
reduced local property taxes.  Town officials and others opposed to the initiative suggest 
it will lead to dramatic cuts in local public services.  Opponents also argue that it would 
reduce local control, as some services would likely become centralized or provided by the 
state government. 
 
If approved by Maine voters, the initiative would place a one-percent cap on the local 
property tax rate.  The plan also would set property valuations at the 1996-1997 “full-
cash value” of real and personal property.  In an April 16, 2004 Maine Supreme Court 
Opinion provided to the Legislature, four Justices opined that this “roll-back” p vision is 
unconstitutional and three Justices declined to offer an opinion on constitutionality 
finding it preferable for this to be determined in a fully litigated case (Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court, 2004).  Our analysis, therefore, does not assume unconstitutionality of this 
provision of the tax cap proposal. 
 
Three studies have examined the potential impacts of the proposed tax cap initiative in 
Maine.  The Maine Municipal Association (MMA) estimates that, based on 2003 data, 
the tax cap would “likely” lead to a $495 million reduction in the property taxes collected 
by Maine municipalities (Maine Municipal Association, 2004a). The MMA analysis 
assumes that, if the referendum passes, the courts would disallow provisions that set 
property valuations at 1996- 7 levels.  Maine Revenue Services found that, assuming 
the valuation method in the referendum is ruled as unconstitutional, the tax cap would 
lead to a $546.6 million revenue shortfall (Gerard, 2004). 
 
The MMA also examined the effects of the tax cap initiative “as written,” which sets 
valuations at the 1996-1997 full-cash value of real and personal property.  This MMA 
study found that towns would have lost $821 million in revenue if the prop rty tax cap 
had been in effect in 2003 (Maine Municipal Association, 2004b).   
 
Maine is not the first state to consider limits on local tax rates.  California set a limit on 
property taxes under Proposition 13 enacted in 1978.  Proposition 13 ca ped tax rates at 
one percent of a property’s 1975-76 value and limited increases in that value to two 
percent per year.  Similar to the tax cap initiative in Maine, Proposition 13 only allows 
properties to be revaluated when there is a change in ownership.
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As discussed in Section 9, the overall lesson learned from other states is that property tax 
caps can have impacts beyond the straightforward reduction of one type of tax.  Changing 
local tax structures can shift the tax burden away from some property own rs, taxpayers, 
and businesses and onto others; can shift control of local revenues and expenditures from 
one level of government to another; can force communities to raise other fees; and can 
affect land use and property values.
 
The complete long-term impacts of a property tax cap in Maine cannot be known at this 
time.  With that in mind, this report presents information on the fiscal effects of the 
property tax cap, if it had been in effect in 2003, on Maine municipalities and the state 
government.  We use the most currently available data from Maine Revenue Services, the 
U.S. Census Bureau, the Maine Department of Education, the Maine Office of Fiscal and 
Program Review, and the MMA.  Impacts presented in the report are based on the tax cap 
initiative as written, which sets property valuations at 1996-1997 full-cash values.  This is 
done to provide, as close as possible, the impacts of the actual referendum included on 
the ballot.  If the courts disallow the valuation method put forth in the referendum, the 
impacts can be expected to differ from those presented. 
 
The following seven questions motivate the research presented in this report: 
 
ð What types of fiscal impacts would Maine municipalities face as a result of the 
tax cap? 
 
ð What would happen to local property tax rates? 
 
ð How much property tax revenue would municipalities lose from vacation 
homeowners? 
 
ð How would additional state spending on local education influence the potential 
impacts of the property tax cap? 
 
ð How would the tax cap revenue impacts compare to current local and state 
government spending levels? 
 
ð What types of increases in state income and sales taxes could offset the local 
revenue lost from the property tax cap? 
 
ð What long-term effects would a property tax cap have on Maine municipalities 
and the state government? 
 
 
2. KEY PROVISIONS OF THE TAX CAP INITIATIVE 
 
The tax cap referendum on the November 2, 2004 ballot will read: “Do you want to limit 
property taxes to 1% of the assessed value of the property?”   
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A more detailed explanatio  of the initiative is that “the maximum amount of any ad 
valorem tax on real property and personal property shall not exceed 1% of the full-cash 
value of such property.”1  Full-cash value in 1996 is defined as the “total assessed 
valuation of real or pe sonal property as shown on the 1996-97 tax bill.”2  In cases where 
real or personal property is “not already assessed up to the state regulation of 100% 
valuation of the 1996- 7 total value,” the property “may be reassessed to reflect that 
valuation.”3  For property that is purchased, newly constructed, or changes ownership 
after the 1997 assessment, full-cash value is defined as the “appraised value of real and 
personal property when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in ownership has 
occurred.”4 
 
As outlined above, the property tax base allowed under the proposal is tied to the 1996 
full-state value of real and personal property.5  We adjust this base to account for 
investments in equipment and machinery, construction of residential homes and 
commercial or industrial facilities, and changes in the value of residential and business 
real estate that changed ownership since 1996.  The 1996 full-state value of real and 
personal property, including allowed adjustments to this base, is referred to in the report 
as the “tax base allowed under the tax cap proposal.” 
 
It is noteworthy that under the tax cap proposal the one-percent tax is applied to the “full-
cash value” of real and personal property.  This differs from the current system in Maine 
that computes tax rates relative to the assessed municipal valuation of real and personal 
property (which is typically below the full-state value).  This difference makes it 
inappropriate to compare current tax rates to the rates allowed under the tax cap proposal.  
Fortunately, Maine Revenue Services computes a variety of statistics for each 
municipality that allow for appropriate comparisons.  We use these statistics to estimate 
the 1996 and 2003 full-state value of real and personal property, and to make 
comparisons between current “full-state value tax rates” and the rates allowed under the 
tax cap proposal. 
 
Table 1 shows 2003 property tax rates computed under the current system and full-state 
value tax rates for residential real estate.  The Table includes the state’s 15 largest 
municipalities in terms of population size according to the 2000 Census.  The 2003 
property tax rate, reported in the 2003 Municipal Valuation Return Statistical Summary, 
is computed by dividing the municipality’s commitment by the total assessed v ue of 
real and personal property.   
 
The next column, labeled as “average ratio,” is a Maine Revenue Services statistic that 
relates a property’s assessed value to its “bona fide selling price.”  Maine Revenue 
Services uses this statistic to convert residential real estate from assessed valuations to 
                                         
1 Language proposed to be enacted as 36 MRSA c. 103, sub-  I, Art. 1-A, section 352, subsection 1. 
2 Proposed section 351, subsection 4 of “An Act to Impose Limits on Real and Personal Property Taxes.” 
3 Proposed section 353, subsection 1 of “An Act to Impose Limits on Real and Personal Property Taxes.” 
4 Proposed section 353, subsection 1 of “An Act to Impose Limits on Real and Personal Property Taxes.” 
5 Full-state value, referred to by Maine Revenue Services as “state value,” is defined as the full-valu  
conversion of local assessed value. 
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full-state values.  The entries in bold type are the average ratios used to compute the 
2005 Equalized State Valuation, while the other entries are the average ratios used to 
compute the 2004 Equalized State Valuation.6  Ratios less than 1.0 indicate that average 
market prices of residential real estate are greater than municipal assessed valuations.  
When this occurs, the full-state value tax rate is lower than the tax rate computed under 
the current system.  The right-hand-side column shows the 2003 full-state value tax rate 
for residential real estate.  These tax rates are used in Section 5 of the report to compare 
2003 full-state value tax rates to post-initiative tax rates. 
 
The tax cap initiative allows for an exception to the one-percent limit on real and 
personal property taxes.  It states that this limit “shall not apply to ad valorem taxes or 
special assessments to pay the interest and redemption charges on any indebtedness 
approved by voters prior to the effective date of this article.”7  For this reason, the tax rate 
in place after the tax cap initiative could exceed one percent in many of the municipalities 
that have pre-existing voter-approved debt.8  This tax rate, referred to in the report as the 
“post-initiative tax rate,” may be less than one percent in municipalities where the current 
commitment is less than the amount of taxes the municipality can collect under the tax 
cap proposal. 
 
 
3. WHAT TYPES OF FISCAL IMPACTS WOULD MAINE MUNICIPALITIES 
FACE AS A RESULT OF THE TAX CAP? 
 
Bottom Line: Maine municipalities would have experienced a combined fiscal deficit of 
$687.7 million if the property tax cap had been in effect in 2003.  The combined deficit in 
the 15 largest municipalities would have been $243.1 million, which is about 35 percent 
of the total property tax revenue loss across all municipalities included in the study. 
 
Full Explanation: 
In this section, we estimate the fiscal impacts that Maine municipalities would have faced 
if the property tax cap had been in effect, as written, in 2003.  This involves comparing 
the actual 2003 spending commitment to the estimated amount of taxes municipalities 
could have collected under the tax cap proposal.9  The latter amount is tied to the 1996 
full-state value of real and personal property with adjustments to account for investments 
in equipment and machinery, construction of residential homes and business facilities, 
and changes in the value of residential and business real estate that changed ownership.  
Information on the 1996 full-state value of real and personal property is available for 
                                         
6 The 2005 Equalized State Valuation lists the full-state value of all taxable property as of April 1, 2003.  
These figures are currently available for 311 of the 472 municipalities included in the analysis.  If the 
average ratios change between the 2004 and 2005 Equalized State Valuations in the other 161 
municipalities, the full-state value tax rates in these municipalities will change as well. 
7 Proposed section 352, subsection 2 of “An Act to Impose Limits on Real and Personal Property Taxes.” 
8 About 40 Maine municipalities have debt that is approved by elected officials, and not local residents 
(Gagnon, 2004).  In this study, we treat all debt as voter approved. 
9 This approach assumes that municipal commitments are equal to expenditures. 
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each municipality from Maine Revenue Services.10  Calculations used to estimate the 
value of adjustments to this base are described below.   
 
We used guidelines provided by Maine Revenue Services to convert municipal assessed 
valuations, listed in the Municipal Valuation Return Statistical Summary, to full-state 
values of personal property, residential real estate and business real estate.  The assessed 
value of personal property is computed as the sum of production equipment and 
machinery, business equipment, and “all other personal property.”  We used the “certified 
ratio” for each municipality, or the “adjusted certified ratio” or “adjusted variant ratio” 
when necessary under Maine Revenue Services guidelines, to convert the assessed value 
of personal property to the full-state value of personal property.11 
 
The statistical summary also reports assessed valuations of land and buildings in each 
municipality.  We used information provided by Maine Revenue Services to separate the 
value of land and buildings into residential and business real estate.  The assessed 
valuations of residential real estate are converted into full-state values using the “average 
ratio” described in Section 2.  We used the municipal “certified ratio,” or the “adjusted 
certified ratio” or “adjusted variant ratio” when necessary under Maine Revenue Services 
guidelines, to convert the assessed value of business real estate to the full- te value of 
business real estate. 
 
Table 2 shows the 1996 and 2003 full-state values of personal property, residential real 
estate and business real estate.  The total values of real and personal property exceed the 
sum of the three included categories because the total values include electrical utility 
properties, and the use values of open space, farmland and land classified under the 
Maine Tree Growth Law.  The 1996 full-state value of real and personal property is $67.4 
billion, which is the base to which allowed adjustments are made. 
 
Provisions of the referendum allow for the following adjustments to the 1996 full-stat
value of real and personal property: 
 
ð investments in equipment and machinery 
ð construction of residential homes 
ð changes in the value of r sidential real estate that changed ownership 
ð construction of commercial and industrial facilities 
ð changes in the value of business real estate that changed ownership 
  
                                         
10 The 1996 full-state value is from the 1998 Equalized State Valuation. 
11 Maine Revenue Services uses the municipal “certified ratio” to convert commercial, industrial and 
personal property from assessed values to full-state va ues when the certified ratio is less than or equal to 
110 percent of the average ratio.  The average of the certified ratio and the average ratio is used for these 
conversions when the certified ratio is more than 110 percent, but less than or equal to 120 percent, of the 
average ratio.  The “adjusted variant ratio,” defined as 120 percent of the average ratio, is used when the 
certified ratio is more than 120 percent of the average ratio. 
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The full-state value of new equipment and machinery is calculated by subtracting the 
full-state value of personal property in 1996 from the full-sta e value of personal property 
in 2003.  This amount totals $2.82 billion across 472 Maine municipalities.   
 
We use U.S. Census data on the value of residential building permits issued between 
1996 and 2002 in each municipality to capture, allowing for a one-year construction lag, 
the value of new residential homes that were completed between 1997 and 2003.  We 
also used Census data to estimate the percentage of homes that changed ownership.  
Information on the year that a householder moved into a housing unit is used to estimate, 
as of 2003, the percentage of householders that moved into their homes in each of the 
years between 1997 and 2003.  We use these percentages to account for changes in the
full-state value of owner-occupied homes that changed ownership.   
 
Combining the value of residential building permits with adjustments for changes in the 
full-state value of owner-occupied homes that changed ownership, we arrive at a $10.2 
billion adjustment to the 1996 full-state value of residential real estate.  This equates to 
29.5 percent of the $34.4 billion increase in the full-state value of residential real estate 
between 1996 and 2003.  The remaining 70.5 percent reflects changes in the value of 
residential real estate that did not change ownership.12 
 
Finally, we made adjustments to the 1996 full-state va ue of business real estate.  We do 
not have municipality-level information on the construction and sales of commercial and 
industrial real estate.  Thus, we used percentages calculated from the adjustments made to 
residential real estate and applied them to the total increase in the full-state value of 
business real estate.  Adjustments to the 1996 full-state value of business real estate equal 
$1.81 billion, which is 29.5 percent of the total increase in the value of business real 
estate between 1996 and 2003. 
 
To summarize, adjustments allowed to the 1996 full-state value of real and personal 
property under the tax cap proposal amount to $2.82 billion in personal property, $10.2 
billion in residential real estate, and $1.81 billion in commercial real estate.  After 
making these adjustments, we arrive at an $82.6 billion tax base allowed under the tax 
cap proposal.  This is $15.2 billion more than the 1996 full-state value of real and 
personal property.13 
 
The tax cap proposal sets a one-percent limit on the tax rate applied to this base of $82.6 
billion.  The proposal also allows municipalities to raise additional taxes, above the one-
                                         
12 The change in the full-state value of residential real estate also reflects changes in the value of renter-
occupied housing units, some of which may have changed ownership between 1996 and 2003.  Thus, we 
may have underestimated the adjustments made to the 1996 full-s ate value of residential real estate.  
However, the Census data used to calculate the percentage of owner-occupied homes that changed 
ownership includes owner- and renter-occupied housing units.  Assuming that renters move more 
frequently than homeowners, we may have overestimated the adjustments made to the 1996 full-state 
value of residential real estate.  
13 This amount exceeds the sum of the individual adjustments listed because it also includes changes in the 
value of electrical utility properties, and changes in the use values of open space, farmland and land 
classified under the Maine Tree Growth Law. 
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percent cap, to cover pre-existing voter-approved debt.  We used information from the 
MMA survey of Maine municipalities to estimate the level of debt payments made in 
2003.14   
 
For municipalities that completed surveys, we calculated the percentage of the total 
municipal commitment that was spent on debt service in 2001.  These percentages varied 
across municipalities of different size categories.  Municipalities with overall spending 
commitments greater than $5 million spent an average of 4.8 percent on debt service, 
those with commitments between $1 million and $5 million spent an average of 2.4 
percent on debt service, and those with commitments of less than $1 million spent an 
average of 2.1 percent on debt service.  For municipalities that completed surveys, we 
applied the percentages from 2001 to the actual commitment in 2003 to estimate the 
amount spent on debt payments.  We used the average percentage corresponding to the 
total commitment (by category) to estimate the value of debt payments for municipalities 
that did not complete surveys.  The estimated value of debt payments across 472 Maine 
municipalities is $87.8 million.15 
 
As described earlier, the total amount of taxes a municipality can collect under the tax 
cap proposal is calculated as one percent of the tax base allowed under the tax cap 
proposal plus the amount spent on debt payments.  We calculate fiscal deficits as the 
difference between the actual 2003 commitment and the amount of taxes the municipality 
could have collected under the tax cap proposl.  In ca es where the amount of taxes the 
municipality could have collected exceeds the actual commitment, the municipality 
would not have incurred a fiscal deficit.  The total deficit summed across 472 
municipalities is $687.7 million. 
 
Table 3 shows our estimates of the fiscal deficits for the 15 largest Maine municipalities, 
if the tax cap had been in place in 2003 (as written).  The municipal commitment is the 
actual amount of property taxes collected in 2003.  The next column, labeled “Collections 
under the Tax Cap Proposal” is the amount of property taxes that the municipalities could 
have collected under the tax cap proposal.  The combined deficit in the 15 largest 
municipalities is $243.1 million, which is about 35 percent of the total property tax 
revenue loss across all 472 municipalities. 
 
 
4. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO LOCAL PROPERTY TAX RATES? 
 
Bottom Line: The average full-state value tax rate for residential real estate would have 
decreased from 1.53 percent to 1.11 percent if the tax cap had beenin effect in 2003.  
The average post-ini iative tax rate exceeds one percent because the tax cap proposal 
allows municipalities to raise taxes, above the one-percent limit, to cover pre-existing 
voter-approved debt.   
                                         
14 The MMA survey, conducted during the fall of 2002, collected FY 2001 financial information from 242 
participating municipalities. 
15 By comparison, US Census data on state and local government finances indicate that Maine 
municipalities spent $90.8 million on interest on general debt in FY 2002.  
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The full-state value tax rate for residential real estate would decrease under the property 
tax cap in 391 municipalities.  On the other hand, the full-state value tax rate for 
residential real estate would increase under the property tax cap in 81 municipalities.  
The average individual in these municipalities who purchased or built a home around 
2003 would pay higher taxes under the property tax cap.  The average individual who 
purchased or built a home prior to 2003 would pay lower taxes if the increase in value, 
between the year the home was purchased or built and 2003, more than offsets the 
increase in the tax rate. 
 
Although it may seem counterintuitive that the amount of taxes paid by some individuals 
would increase under the property tax cap, the explanation is relatively straightforward.  
In some Maine municipalities, the amount of taxes collected would not change (or would 
decrease only slightly) under the property tax cap.  The tax cap proposal, however, sets 
property valuations at the 1996-19 7 “full-cash value” of real and personal property.  
Thus, individuals who purchased or built homes in the years prior to, or just after, 1996 
would pay lower taxes under the property tax cap.  In order for the total amount of taxes 
collected to remain unchanged, these reductions must be offset by increases in taxes paid 
by individuals who purchased or built homes in later years.  Some Maine businesses 
would pay higher taxes under the property tax cap as well.
 
Full Explanation:  
Post-initiative tax rates in Maine municipalities that experience fiscal deficits would 
range from one percent to values greater than one percent in municipalities with pre-
existing voter-approved debt.  Municipalities that would not experience fiscal deficits 
under the tax cap proposal may have post-initiative tax rates of less than one percent.  
 
If the tax cap were in effect in 2003, the “post-initiative tax rate” would have averaged 
1.11 percent across 472 Maine municipalities.  This tax rate would have been less than 
one percent in 24 municipalities, and greater than or equal to ne percent in the remaining 
448 municipalities.  As discussed in Section 2, 2003 tax rates based on municipal 
assessed valuations cannot be compared directly to the post-initiative tax rates.  Statistics 
provided by Maine Revenue Services, however, can be used to make such comparisons. 
 
Full-state value tax rates for residential real estate are computed by multiplying the 2003 
property tax rate by the “sales ratio,” as shown in Table 1.  After making this adjustment 
for all municipalities, we found that the average full-state value tax rate for residential 
real estate is 1.53 percent.  The full-state value tax rate for personal property and business 
real estate is found by multiplying the property tax rate by the “certified ratio,” or the 
“adjusted certified ratio” or the “adjusted variant ratio” when necessary under Maine 
Revenue Services guidelines.16  After making the appropriate adjustments, we found that 
the average full-state value tax rate for personal property and business real estate is 1.53 
percent. 
 
                                         
16 These guidelines are discussed in footnote 11. 
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Table 4 compares the full-state value tax rates for residential real estate to estimated post-
initiative tax rates in the 15 largest Maine municipalities.  The first column of figures, 
reproduced from Table 1, is the 2003 full-state value tax r te for residential real estate.  
The next column shows the estimated post-initiative tax rate.  The right-hand-side 
column shows the percentage decrease in the full-sta e value tax rate for residential real 
estate under the property tax cap. 
 
Table 5 shows the average taxes paid in these municipalities, with and without the tax 
cap, by an individual who built or purchased a home valued at $150,000 in 2003.  
Estimates presented in the column labeled “2003 Property Taxes” are calculated by 
multiplying the full-state value tax rate for residential real estate by the market value of 
$150,000.  The next column shows the estimated taxes paid under the tax cap proposal.  
The right-hand-side column shows the decrease in property taxes that the average 
homeowner - who built or purchased a home worth $150,000 in 2003 - would pay under 
the property tax cap.
 
Although the post-initiative tax rate is less than the 2003 full-state value tax rate for 
residential real estate in many municipalities (such as those shown in tabl  4 and 5), the 
tax rate would increase under the tax cap proposal in 81 municipalities.  This does not 
mean, however, that all homeowners in these municipalities would pay higher taxes.  The 
total amount of taxes paid is determined by the tax rate and  p operty’s assessed 
valuation.  Thus, the average individual who purchased or built a home prior to 2003 
would pay lower taxes if the increase in value, between the year the home was purchased 
or built and 2003, more than offsets the increase in the tax rate.  On the other hand, the 
average individual who recently purchased or built a home would pay higher taxes under 
the property tax cap in these municipalities.  The exact year in which a homeowner would 
have needed to purchase or build a home to pay lower taxes would differ by municipality. 
 
Table 6 shows the municipalities in which the full-stat  va ue tax rate for residential real 
estate would increase as a result of the tax cap.  Similar to Table 4, the first column of 
figures is the 2003 full-state value tax rate for residential real estate.  The next column 
shows the estimated post-initiative tax rate.  The right-hand-side column shows the 
percentage increase in the full-state value tax rate for residential real estate under the 
property tax cap. 
 
Table 7 compares the estimated taxes paid in these municipalities, before and after the tax 
cap, by the average homeowner who built or purchased a home valued at $150,000 in 
2003.  Similar to Table 5, estimates presented in the first column of figures are calculated 
by multiplying the average 2003 full-state value tax rate for residential real estate by the 
market value of $150,000.  Estimates shown in the next column are calculated by 
multiplying the home’s value by the post-initiative tax rate.  The right-hand-side column 
shows the increase in property taxes that the average homeowner - who built or 
purchased a home worth $150,000 in 2003 - would pay under the property tax cap.  The 
municipalities shown in Tables 6 and 7 are quite diverse in terms of household income 
and housing values.   
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Table 8 shows that median household incomes range from less than $30,000 per year in 
20 of the municipalities to over $40,000 per year in 25 of the municipalities.  Median 
housing values in these municipalities also vary considerably.  The right-hand-side 
column shows the percentage of “recent movers” (i.e., individuals who moved between 
1995 and 2000) who previously lived elsewhere in Maine.  This information suggests 
that, in most cases, a relatively small percentage of the individuals who would pay higher 
taxes under the property tax cap are from outside the state. 
 
The full-state value tax rate for personal property would increase in 65 municipalities 
under the tax cap proposal.  These municipalities are shown in Table 9.  The first column 
of figures is the 2003 full-state value tax rate for personal property.  In some 
municipalities, this rate may differ from the full-s ate value tax rate for residential real 
estate because of differences in the statistics used to convert municipal assessed 
valuations to full-state values.  The next column shows post-initiative tax rates, which are 
identical to those presented in Table 6.  The right-hand-side column shows the percentage 
increase in the full-state value tax rate for personal pr perty under the property tax cap.
 
Table 10 shows the total increase in taxes paid on personal property under the property 
tax cap proposal.  The first column shows the 2003 full-state value of personal property 
in each municipality.  The tax cap referendum states that, “[d]epreciation on personal 
property shall be depreciated and listed from the annual form as supplied by the 
taxpayer.”17  This allowance for depreciation suggests that, in most cases, personal 
property is taxed at its full- tate value in a given year.  The amount of taxes paid is 
calculated by multiplying the full-state value of personal property by the full-s ate value 
tax rate.  The middle two columns show the actual amount of personal property taxes 
paid in 2003 and the estimated amount of personal property taxes that would have been 
paid if the tax cap had been in effect in 2003.  The right-hand-side column shows the total 
increase in personal property taxes paid by businesses under the property tax cap. 
 
 
5. HOW MUCH PROPERTY TAX REVENUE WOULD MUNICIPALITIES 
LOSE FROM VACATION HOMEOWNERS? 
 
Bottom Line: Maine municipalities would lose $50.9 million, or 31.9 percent, of the 
property taxes paid by vacation homeowners under the property tax cap. 
 
Full Explanation: 
As shown in the previous section, the property tax cap could lower the taxes paid by 
Maine homeowners and businesses.  It may also decrease the taxes paid by out-of-state 
and Maine residents who own vacation homes in the state.  If the state increases income 
or sales taxes to help balance municipal budgets, the property tax cap could lead to a 
reduction in the property taxes paid by out-of-state residents that is offset through higher 
taxes paid by individuals who pay other state taxes.   
 
                                         
17 Proposed section 353, subsection 1 of “An Act to Impose Limits on Real and Personal Property Taxes.” 
Effects of One-Percent Property Tax Cap 
 11 
 
 
The unavailability of town-level data on out-of-state homeownership, however, precludes 
us from estimating the shift in the taxes paid by out-of-state homeowners to individuals 
who pay state income and sales taxes.  U.S. Census data, however, can be used to 
estimate the amount of tax revenue that would be lost from “vacation” homeowners.  
Documentation provided by the Census indicates that housing units classified as “vacant 
– for seasonal, recreational, and occasional use” can be used as a proxy for “vacation” 
homes.18   
 
We use this information t  calculate the percentage of vacation homes in each 
municipality, found by dividing the number of vacation housing units by the total number 
of housing units.  Based on these percentages, we estimate that Maine municipalities 
collected a total of $159.8 million in property taxes from vacation homeowners in 2003.  
This is 14.7 percent of the $1.08 billion in taxes collected on residential real estate.  The 
amount of taxes collected from vacation homeowners would fall to an estimated $108.9 
million under the tax cap proposal.  These figures suggest that Maine municipalities 
would lose $50.9 million, or 31.9 percent, of the property taxes paid by vacation 
homeowners.   
 
 
6. HOW WOULD ADDITIONAL STATE SPENDING ON LOCAL EDUCATION 
INFLUENCE THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE PROPERTY TAX CAP? 
 
Bottom Line: Incorporating the additional school funding that MMA predicts 
municipalities would receive from the state government, we find that the estimated fiscal 
deficits under the property tax cap would decrease from $687.7 million to $535.2 million. 
 
Full Explanation: 
Municipal fiscal deficits are calculated as the difference between the actual 2003 
commitment and the amount of taxes the municipality could have collected under the tax 
cap proposal.  Thus, a reduction in the local spending commitment would decrease the 
size of a municipality’s fiscal deficit.  The passage of the MMA initiated bill in the June 
2004 election, which increases the amount of general purpose aid for education provided 
to Maine municipalities, could decrease the fiscal impacts of the property tax cap. 
 
In this section, we estimate the impact of the property tax cap after incorporating the 
reduction in local education spending made possible by the passage of the MMA bill.  
We use information from the MMA on the increase in state aid for education that each 
municipality would receive.19  Our analysis assumes that municipalities use 100 percent 
of the increased state funding received from the MMA bill to lower municipal spending.  
Although there is no guarantee that this will occur, the analysis illustrates the maximum 
amount by which the implementation of the MMA bill could decrease the fiscal deficits.  
                                         
18 According to the 2000 Census, Maine has the highest percentage of season l-, recreational-, or 
occasional-use homes in the United States. 
19 The analysis presented in the MMA study is based on the current school funding formula, which will 
change in 2005 under the Essential Programs and Services model.  Thus, actual increases in state aid for 
education are expected to differ from the estimates used in this study.    
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On the other hand, results presented in previous sections of the report can be interpreted 
as the impacts of the property tax cap if the municipalities did not use any of the 
additional revenue to lower local spending. 
 
It should be noted that the analysis does not incorporate the full increase in state aid for 
education that municipalities are predicted to re eive under the MMA bill in the absence 
of the property tax cap.20  This is because, even after incorporating the effects of the 
MMA bill, the amount of local spending on education exceeded the amount of tax 
revenue received under the property tax cap in many Maine municipalities.  In these 
municipalities, we reduced the amount of local spending on education to one percent of 
the tax base allowed under the tax cap proposal, and then decreased the amount received 
from the state government in proportion to the decrease in local spending on education.  
With these adjustments in place, municipalities are estimated to receive an additional 
$155.5 million in state aid for education as a result of the MMA bill, if the tax cap was in 
effect in 2003.  Incorporating this additional state aid for education, we find that the 
estimated fiscal deficits under the property tax cap would decrease from $687.7 million to 
$535.2 million. 
 
 
7. HOW WOULD THE TAX CAP EFFECTS COMPARE TO CURRENT LOCAL 
AND STATE GOVERNMENT SPENDING LEVELS? 
 
Bottom Line: Maine municipalities spent an estimated $2.16 billion on public services in 
2003, including $991.2 million in local spending on education and over $100 million 
each on general administration, law enforcement and road maintenance.  Assumi g that
municipalities use 100 percent of the additional state school funding to decrease local 
expenditures on education, we estimate that total municipal expenditures would have 
decreased to $1.32 billion if the tax cap had been in effect in 2003.  Spending on general 
administration, law enforcement and road maintenance would have decreased from over 
$100 million in each category to less than $50 million in each category under the 
property tax cap.  Cuts made to expenditure areas other than local education, debt 
payments and county taxes represent a 69.4 percent reduction from spending levels 
without the property tax cap.   
 
State appropriations total $5.22 billion over the two-year budget for FY 04-05.  
Assuming that state revenues are fixed and municipalities use 100 percent of the 
additional state school funding to decrease local expenditures on education, we estimate 
that it would require 20.5 percent of the total state budget to help municipalities 
overcome the effects of the property tax cap. 
 
                                         
20 The MMA study entitled “Estimated Town-by-Town Impact of the Citizen-Initiated School Finance and 
Tax Reform Act of 2003” shows that municipalities would receive an addit onal $187 million in state aid 
for education under that Act.  This amount does not include additional state spending of $18.8 million for 
a “regionalization plan,” or $45.5 million in additional adjustments.  In total, the MMA study found that 
the School Finance and Tax Reform Act of 2003 would have increased state spending on education by 
about $255.9 million in FY 2004.  Again, however, the MMA analysis is not based on the Essential 
Programs and Services school funding model, which takes effect in 2005.  
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Full Explanation: 
Fiscal deficits associated with the property tax cap could lead to changes in the provision 
of local services, in the services provided or financed by the state government, or in fees 
or other state taxes.  In this section, we examine the reduction in local government 
spending that could occur as a result of the property tax cap.  We also analyze the 
reduction in state government spending that would be necessary if the state were to help 
municipalities balance their budgets.  In the next sectio , we look at the increase in state 
sales and income taxes that could offset the local revenue lost under the property tax cap. 
 
Before looking at expenditures, we first examine the sources of revenue for Maine 
municipalities.  The four most important revenue sources to Maine municipalities in 2003 
were (1) taxes on real and personal property, (2) general purpose aid to local schools, (3) 
excise taxes on motor vehicles and watercrafts, and (4) revenues received through state 
and municipal revenue sharing.  Maine Revenue Services statistics show that 
municipalities received a total of $1.60 billion in property taxes in 2003.  This amount 
would decrease to an estimated $909.4 million under the property tax cap.  Maine 
Department of Education statistics show that municipalities received $661.5 million in 
general purpose aid to local schools in 2003.  This amount would increase to an estimated 
$845.8 million, based on MMA estimates.21  Municipalities collected an additional 
$181.0 million in excise taxes, and received $103.9 million through state and municipal 
revenue sharing.22 
 
Table 11 shows information on the estimated expenditures made by 472 Maine 
municipalities in 2003.  Local education spending figures are from the Maine Department 
of Education.  Other expenditure information is estimated using data from the MMA 
survey of Maine municipalities.23  For municipalities that completed surveys, we 
calculated the percentage of expenditures in each category relative to total municipal 
commitments in 2001.  These percentages varied across municipalities of different size 
categories.  For the municipalities that completed surveys, we applied the percentages 
from 2001 to the total municipal commitment in 2003.  We used the average percentage 
corresponding to the total c mmitment size (by category) to estimate expenditures for the 
municipalities that did not complete surveys. 
 
The first column of figures shows estimated municipal expenditures in 2003, without 
implementing the effects of the MMA bill or the property tax cap.  Municipalities spent 
an estimated $2.16 billion on public services, including $991.2 million in local spending 
on education and over $100 million each on general administration, law enforcement and 
road maintenance.  Municipalities spent between $50 and $100 million on fire protection, 
solid waste and recycling, county taxes and debt service.  The next column shows the 
                                         
21 The original $661.5 million in state spending on local education is less than the figure of $681.1 million 
in the Maine Department of Education 2003-04 Subsidy Computation report because our analysis is 
based on a smaller number of municipalities th n included in the Department of Education report.  The 
increase in state spending on local education from the School Finance and Tax Reform Act of 2003 is 
less than the MMA estimates of $187.0 million for the same reason. 
22 Excise tax data, which inlude information on motor vehicles and watercrafts, is from Maine Revenue 
Services.  Information on state and municipal revenue sharing is from the Maine State Treasurer’s Office. 
23 See footnote 14.
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estimated amount spent after incorporating a reduction in local education spending made 
possible by the passage of the MMA bill.  If municipalities use 100 percent of the 
additional school funding - MMA predicts they will receive - to decrease local 
expenditures, the total amount spent on local public services would decrease from $2.16 
billion to $1.98 billion. 
 
The right-hand-side column of Table 11 shows a hypothetical example of estimated local 
expenditures under the property tax cap.  These figures are based on a scenario that 
assumes (1) municipalities lose $687.7 million in revenue under the property tax cap, (2) 
municipalities use 100 percent of the additional state school funding to decrease local 
expenditures on education, (3) municipalities maintain current spending levels on debt 
service and county taxes, (4) municipalities do not receive additional revenue from the 
state, and (5) cuts to expenditure categories other than local education, debt service and 
county taxes are made in proportion to their amounts relative to the total budget.  Under 
this scenario, total municipal expenditures would decrease to $1.32 billion.  Spending on 
general administration, law enforcement and road maintenance would decrease from over 
$100 million in each category to less than $50 million in each category under the 
property tax cap.  Cuts made to expenditure areas other than local education, debt 
payments and county taxes represent a 69.4 percent reduction from spending levels 
without the property tax cap.  Other scenarios will yield different cuts to municipal 
services. 
 
In order for Maine municipalities to continue providing current levels of public s rvices 
under the property tax cap, they would need to receive additional financial resources from 
the state government.  With no increase in state revenue, however, this would lead to 
reductions in spending by the state government.  To put these cuts in o p rspec ive, we 
show current FY 04- 5 general fund appropriations in Table 12.  The first column of 
figures shows the general fund appropriations, by category, for FY 04-05.  State 
appropriations total $5.22 billion over the two-year budget cycle. 
 
The right-hand-side column of Table 12 is a hypothetical example of FY 04-05 general 
fund appropriations that would be necessary to accommodate the increased state spending 
on education estimated under the MMA bill.  This analysis is based on the assumptions 
that total state expenditures are fixed at $5.22 billion (i.e., no additional state revenues) 
and the passage of the MMA bill will require an additional $248.7 million in state 
spending on education in both years, for a two-year total of $479.5 million.  The analysis 
also assumes that in order to make room for the increased state spending on education, 
the remaining expenditure categories are decreased in proportion to their size relative to 
the overall budget.  Under this scenario, 46.3 percent of the stat’s budg t would be spent 
on K-12 education.   
 
Table 13 shows additional hypothetical examples of FY 04-05 general fund 
appropriations under several scenarios related to the property tax cap.  The column 
labeled “Hypothetical Appropriations under Tax Cap” shows a hypothetical example of 
FY 04-05 general fund appropriations that would help Maine municipalities balance the 
fiscal deficits under the property tax cap.  Assumptions underlying this analysis are that 
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total state expenditures are fixed at $5.22 billion, the property tax cap will leave 
municipalities with a $687.7 million deficit in both years, state spending on K-12 
education is held at $1.92 billion, and the remaining expenditure categories are decreased 
in proportion to their size relative to the budget.  Under this hypothetical scenario, over 
one-quarter of the state’s budget would be used to help municipalities overcome the 
effects of the property tax cap. 
 
The next column shows a hypothetical example of FY 04-05 general fund appropriations 
that would be necessary to help Maine municipalities bridge the gap between spending 
commitments and revenues allowed under the property tax cap, incorporating the effects 
of the MMA bill.  This analysis is based on the case in which Maine municipalities use 
the additional state school funding to reduce their spending.  Assumptions underlying the 
analysis are that total state expenditures are fixed at $5.22 billion, implementation of the 
MMA bill and the property tax cap will leave municipalities with a $535.2 million deficit 
in both years, state spending on K-12 education is increased to $2.36 billion, and the 
remaining expenditure categories are decreased in proportion to their size relative to the 
budget.  This hypothetical scenario would require $1.07 billion in state spending, or 20.5 
percent of the total budget, to help municipalities overcome the effects of the property tax 
cap. 
 
The right-hand-side column of Table 13 shows a hypothetical example of FY 04-05 
general fund appropriations that would be necessary to help Maine municipalities balance 
fiscal deficits incurred under the property tax cap.  This scenario is based on the case in 
which the state provides 55 percent of the cost of local education, but municipalities do 
not make any reductions in expenditur s made possible by that additional state spending.  
Assumptions underlying the analysis are that total state expenditures are fixed at $5.22 
billion, the property tax cap leaves municipalities with a $687.7 million deficit in both 
years, state spending o  K-12 education is increased to $2.36 billion, and the remaining 
expenditure categories are decreased in proportion to their size relative to the overall 
budget.   
 
 
8. WHAT TYPES OF INCREASES IN STATE INCOME AND SALES TAXES 
COULD OFFSET THE LOCAL REVENUE LOST FROM THE PROPERTY 
TAX CAP? 
 
Bottom Line: The state could make up for the revenue lost under the property tax cap by 
either increasing state income or sales taxes, or some combination of the two.  In order 
for the state to collect $687.7 million in additional revenue to transfer to municipal 
governments, it would need to increase the amount of revenue collected through income 
taxes by 64.2 percent.  For a family with a household income of between $35,650 and 
$45,124, this amounts to an additional $652 in state income taxes.  On the other hand, 
the state would need to increase the amount received through sales and use taxes by 80.2 
percent in order to increase collections by $687.7 million.  This would increase the state 
sales tax rate from 5 percent to slightly over 9 percent. 
 
Effects of One-Percent Property Tax Cap 
 16 
 
 
 
Full Explanation: 
As discussed above, the property tax cap could lead to a reduction in expenditures on 
local public services.  However, municipalities could maintain existing spending levels 
with additional funding received from the state government.  With no additional sources 
of revenue for the state government, this could lead to reductions in state spending in 
other areas.  Municipalities and the state government could maintain current spending 
levels through an increase in state income and/or sales taxes.  In this section, we examine 
the increases in state income and sales taxes that would be necessary to help 
municipalities balance fiscal deficits under the property tax cap. 
 
Table 14 shows the major revenue sources for the tate government in 2003.  The state 
collected $2.39 billion in general fund revenue in 2003.  Of this amount, the state 
collected $1.07 billion in individual income taxes and $857.5 million in sales and use 
taxes.  These two categories made up 80.6 percent of total general fund revenue in 2003.   
 
As presented earlier in the report, Maine municipalities would have lost $687.7 million in 
revenue if the property tax cap had been in effect in 2003.  Fiscal deficits would have 
decreased to $535.2 million if the municipalities used additional state spending on 
education to reduce local expenditures.   
 
The state could make up for the revenue lost under the property tax cap by either 
increasing state income or sales taxes, or some combination of the two.  In order for the 
state to collect $535.2 million to $687.7 million in additional revenue to transfer to 
municipal governments, it would need to increase the amount of revenue collected 
through income taxes by 49.9 percent to 64.2 percent.24  Using i formation from the 2002 
Maine Tax Incidence Study conducted by Maine Revenue Services, we estimate that the 
average Maine family with a household income between $35,650 and $45,124 paid 
$1,016 in state income taxes in 2003.  For the state to increase income tax collctions by 
$687.7 million, our estimates show that a family in this income category would pay an 
additional $652 in state income taxes. 
 
On the other hand, the state would need to increase the amount received through sales 
and use taxes by 62.4 percent to 80.2 percent in order to increase collections by $535.2 
million to $687.7 million.  Based on 2003 taxable sales data from Maine Revenue 
Services, we estimate that the state collected $807.5 million in sales tax revenue under 
the current 5-percent tax rate.  A 9-percent tax rate would have generated $1.51 billion in 
sales tax revenue in 2003, which represents an increase of $651.5 million over the 
amount of sales taxes collected under the 5-p cent tax rate.  Assuming that an increase in 
the sales tax rate do s not lead to a substantial decrease in purchases, we estimate that a 
state sales tax rate of slightly higher than 9 percent would generate the additional revenue 
necessary to help municipalities balance fiscal deficits under the property tax cap. 
                                         
24 As discussed above, the figure of $535.2 million incorporates additional state spending for local 
education.  If the state were to provide revenues to municipalities to cover the impact of the tax cap, and 
transfer revenues to provide additional school funding as predicted by MMA, the total cost to the state 
would be $755 million. 
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9. WHAT LONG-TERM EFFECTS WOULD A PROPERTY TAX CAP HAVE 
ON MAINE MUNICIPALITIES AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT? 
 
Bottom Line: A property tax cap in Maine could have impacts beyond the 
straightforward reduction of one type of tax.  Changing local tax structures could shif  
the tax burden away from some property owners, taxpayers, and businesses and onto 
others; could shift control of local revenues and expenditures from one level of 
government to another; could force communities to raise other fees; and could affect 
land use and property values. 
 
Full Explanation: 
The analysis presented in this report illustrates some of the potential fiscal impacts of a 
one-percent property tax cap on Maine municipalities and the state government.  The 
property tax cap, as written, could lead to fiscal deficits of between $535.2 million and 
$687.7 million across 472 municipalities.  Deficits of these magnitudes could lead to 
reductions in local expenditures on public services - other than local education, debt 
payments and county taxes - of 69.4 percent.  If the state provides additional revenues to 
help municipalities maintain current spending levels, the property tax cap could lead to 
substantial reductions in other state expenditures.  Finally, maintaining current municipal 
and state spending levels under the property tax cap, it would require a 62.4 percent to 
80.2 percent increase in the revenue received from state sales and use taxes, or a 49.9 
percent to 64.2 percent increase in the revenue received from state income taxes. 
 
These figures illustrate the range of short-term fiscal impacts that Maine municipalities 
and the state government could face under the property tax cap.  The fiscal impacts 
estimated in the study could be offset, in part, by additional state and local taxes if Maine 
residents and businesses spend a portion of the money saved through the property tax 
cap.  The long-term effects of a property tax cap, however, are less clear.  In this section, 
we look at the experience in other states with property tax caps, notably C lifor ia and 
Massachusetts, to grasp the potential long-term effects of a property tax cap in Maine. 
 
 
Short-term effects of Proposition 2- ½ in Massachusetts 
 
Sudden revenue drops caused by property tax caps can shock the budgets of local 
communities.  In a study of Massachusetts’ Proposition 2- ½, Rothenberg and Smoke  
(1982) compared the effect of new tax limits on different types of communities.  
Proposition 2- ½, approved by voters in 1980, limits local property taxes in Massachusetts 
to 2.5 percent of a property’s fair market value.  Communities may not increase their tax 
rate by more than 2.5 percent per year.  The proposition also limited motor vehicle excise 
taxes to $25 for every $1,000 of valuation.   
 
Most local governments faced severe revenue losses in the first year after the 
implementation of Proposition 2- ½.  However, not all communities were affected 
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equally.  Rothenberg and Smoke (1982) found that smaller communities lost a smaller 
percentage of their revenue than larger communities; poorer communities fared worse 
than wealthier ones (based on per capita property valuation); and communities with 
declining populations experienced larger revenue losses than growing ones.   
 
Rothenberg and Smoke (1982) also looked at trends in local governments’ respo ses to 
the revenue shock.  For 41 communities, they looked at expenditure changes in seven 
categories immediately following the proposition’s passage: schools, police, fire, streets, 
parks, sanitation, and libraries.  They found that expenditure cuts varied greatly across 
municipalities.  However, communities seemed to protect spending in three categories: 
police, fire, and sanitation.  On average, schools experienced percentage cuts roughly 
double the percentage decrease in total appropriations, perh ps because they comprise a 
large portion of community expenditures.25  Park  and libraries were also subject to large 
reductions in expenditures. 
 
 
Longer-term effects of property tax caps in California and Massachusetts 
 
Supporters of Proposition 13 anticipated that the property tax cap would reduce 
California residents’ overall tax burden and trim government spending.  Michael New of 
the Cato Institute recently completed a comparative analysis of state taxes and 
expenditures in California between 1979 and 2000.  New (2003) found that the 
stabilization of property tax revenues did not stabilize the overall tax burden of 
Californians.  From 1979 to 2000, property taxes remained below 3 percent of state 
personal income but sales and income taxes gradually increased from a 5.5 percent to 7 
percent.26  State and local revenues dropped for a few years after the passage of 
Proposition 13, and then continued to grow.  Likewise, California’s general fund 
spending leveled for a few years and then increased.  New governm nt revenues were 
generated by increases in the sales tax rate and taxes on beer, wine, gasoline, cigarettes, 
and other products.  
 
Studies on the long-term effects of Proposition 13 also show that it increased state control 
over local finances.  The proposition essentially changed property taxes from a local to a 
state tax (Sexton et al, 1999).  It granted the state government the power to collect and 
redistribute property tax revenues according to allocation formulas developed by the 
state.  California’s state government immediately became involved by using revenue 
surpluses in 1979 to bail out many local governments that were suffering drastic revenue 
cuts.  It then assumed primary responsibility for creating and adjusting allocation 
formulas.  Subsequent increases in the sales tax rate are cited as further evidence of a 
                                         
25 Another study of 208 communities in the greater Boston area supports these findings.  Bradbury et al. 
(2001) studied the expenditure patterns of those communities one to four years after the passage of 
Proposition 2- ½.  They found that communities hardest hit by the property tax limits increased school 
expenditures significantly less than communities that saw smaller impacts from Proposition 2- ½. 
26 Sexton et al. (1999) used another measure of tax burden and reached a different conclusion.  Th y fou d 
that California’s per capita tax revenue declined from 13.1 percent in 1979 to 10.2 percent in 1995.  
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power shift (Chapman, 1998).  Chapman (1998) also found that in California, because 
counties cannot adjust the state sales tax rate to pay for local services and since the 
property tax is inaccessible, the revenue sources available to counties are essentially 
controlled by the State.  A desire for financial independence may push local governments 
to find alternative revenue sources over which they have sole control.   
 
Property taxes are generally the primary source of revenue for local governments.  
Limiting that revenue source may force communities to reduce spending or find 
alternative revenue sources.  In California, this process generated a wide range of “arcane 
finance techniques” (Chapman, 1998) such as the creation of special assessment districts. 
 
Sexton et al. (1999) describe the emergence of “special assessment districts.”  These 
districts impose charges on property for certain services such as flood control and street 
lighting.  Fees collected from property owners within these districts increased from $64.4 
million in 1983 to $401.4 million in 1995.  The state also approved “community facilities 
districts” which can impose taxes to finance public facilities such as streets, water and 
sewage, parks, and libraries, as well as public services such as police and fire protection, 
library services, parks and recreation services. 
 
Prior to Proposition 13, infrastructure for new developments (residential, commercial, or 
industrial) was funded through broad-based, community-wide taxes and/or debt.  Since 
1978, there has been a shift toward fees charged to those who are building or using the 
development.  In one California county, total development fees between 1992-1995 for 
permits, water and sewage, fire, traffic, park, and schools, ranged from $16,000 to 
$24,000 per dwelling.  It should be noted that this observation was made during a time of 
rapid development in California.  However, similar types of fee increases were observed 
in Massachusetts (Rothenberg and Snow, 1982).  
 
Chapman (1998) observes an increase in public entrepreneurship.  In order to generate 
revenue, public municipalities are engaging in more creative and risky activities that 
include partnerships with private developers and direct tax subsidies to attract or retain 
private firms or developers. 
 
In California, limitations on revenue generated through property taxes have increased the 
importance of land uses that generated alternative revenue (Chapman, 1998).  For 
example, Californian municipalities receive a portion of the sales tax generated within 
their jurisdiction.  Thus, local governments have competed for the location of large 
retailers and car dealerships in favor of residential development that does not generae 
sales tax revenue (Chapman, 1998). 
 
Sexton et al. (1999) observe that the revaluation of property only when ownership 
changes results in varying tax burdens on taxpayers with identical means and assets.  
Since property values generally increase over time, a household living in a recently 
purchased residence will pay more property tax than an identical household living in an 
identical residence that it has owned for several years.  Comparing tax incidence in two 
California counties revealed that tax rates on identical properties could vary as much as 
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519 percent, depending on the year in which the property was purchased (Sexton et al, 
1999).  By matching household property tax and income data for those counties, 
researchers found that the discrepancies generally b efited lower-income households.  
Apparently, lower-income households tend to move less frequently than higher-income 
households.  Similarly, seniors tended to have lower tax rates than non-seniors livi g in 
identical dwellings. 
 
Rosen (1982) investigated the effects of Proposition 13 on relative property values in the 
San Francisco Bay Area.  The analysis found that deceases in property taxes were 
absorbed into property sale prices.  For the years immediately before and after 
Proposition 13, Rosen (1982) calculated the mean property sale price of each 
municipality and the corresponding level of taxes on a property associated with that 
value.  He found that a one-d llar decrease in relative property taxes corresponded to a 
seven-dollar increase in relative property values.  This supports the notion of 
capitalization: if the cost of owning a home decreases (i.e. a decrease in property tax), 
buyers are willing to pay higher housing prices.   
 
This phenomenon tends to benefit households that move less frequently more than 
households that move more frequently (Sexton et al, 1999).  This so-called “moving 
penalty” could make households and businesses less responsive to economic factors that 
would stimulate them to move to a new area or a different type of facility.  However, 
since the property tax rate is never above one percent of the sale value, this effect may 
not be very large.   
 
Bradbury et al. (2001) found contradictory results in their analysis of property values in 
Massachusetts before and after Proposition 2- ½.  As previously discussed, they found a 
connection between the revenue shocks experienced in some communities and relative 
decreases in school spending.  They also found a positive correlation between school 
spending and house prices.  Thus, they claim that Proposition 2- ½ may have contributed 
to relatively lower house prices in towns that experienced significant revenue losses. 
 
The overall lesson learned from other states is that property tax caps can have impacts 
beyond the straightforward reduction of one type of tax.  Changing local tax structures 
can shift the tax burden away from certain property owners, taxpayers, and businesses 
and onto others; can shift control of local revenues and expenditures from one level of 
government to another; can force communities to raise other fees; and can affect land use 
and property values. 
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Table 1 
2003 Property Tax Rates in Selected Maine Municipalities 
 
   2003 Full-State Value 
 2003 Property Average Tax Rate for 
Municipality Tax Rate Ratio * Residential Real Estate 
    
Portland 2.68% 0.68 1.82% 
    
Lewiston 2.77% 0.79 2.19% 
    
Bangor 2.33% 0.89 2.08% 
    
South Portland 1.75% 0.79 1.38% 
    
Auburn 2.94% 0.69 2.03% 
    
Brunswick 2.15% 0.77 1.66% 
    
Biddeford 1.74% 0.78 1.36% 
    
Sanford 1.64% 0.92 1.51% 
    
Augusta 2.53% 0.83 2.10% 
    
Scarborough 1.65% 0.86 1.42% 
    
Saco 1.87% 0.70 1.31% 
    
Westbrook 2.28% 0.67 1.53% 
    
Waterville 2.74% 0.94 2.58% 
    
Windham 1.73% 0.81 1.40% 
    
Gorham 1.94% 0.84 1.63% 
    
 
Source: Maine Revenue Services and authors’ calculations. 
 
* Entries in bold type are the average tios used to compute the 2005 Equalized State 
Valuation, while the other entries are the average ratios used to compute the 2004 
Equalized State Valuation.  Average ratios from the 2005 Equalized State Valuation are 
currently available for 311 of the 472 municipalities included in the analysis.  If the 
average ratios change between the 2004 and 2005 Equalized State Valuations in the other 
161 municipalities, the full-state value tax rates will change as well. 
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Table 2 
Full-State Values of Real and Personal Property, 1996 and 2003 
 
 Full-State Full-State  Increase in Full-State Value  
Category Value in 1996 Value in 2003 between 1996 and 2003 
    
Personal Property 6,387,280,420 9,206,989,095 2,819,708,675 
    
Residential Real Estate 47,811,373,813 82,176,776,012 34,365,402,199 
    
Business Real Estate 11,616,424,366 17,743,671,793 6,127,247,427 
    
Total Real and Personal Property * 67,401,350,000 111,247,325,192 43,845,975,192 
    
 
Source: Maine Revenu Services and authors’ calculations. 
 
* Total values of real and personal property exceed the sum of the three included categories because the total values include electrical 
utility properties, and the use values of open space, farmland and land classified under the Maine Tree Growth Law. 
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Table 3 
Estimated 2003 Fiscal Deficits in Selected Maine Municipalities 
 
 Municipal  Collections under the Estimated 
Municipality Commitment Tax Cap Proposal Deficit 
    
Portland 111,276,064 54,394,368 56,881,696 
    
Lewiston 38,929,604 20,399,012 18,530,592 
    
Bangor 39,807,705 18,083,779 21,723,926 
    
South Portland 49,067,965 24,671,297 24,396,668 
    
Auburn 35,687,125 14,529,259 21,157,866 
    
Brunswick 24,941,415 12,891,701 12,049,714 
    
Biddeford 25,157,383 13,979,386 11,177,997 
    
Sanford 18,421,209 9,614,678 8,806,531 
    
Augusta 23,695,130 12,175,525 11,519,605 
    
Scarborough 32,969,169 22,159,137 10,810,032 
    
Saco 21,252,361 12,509,637 8,742,724 
    
Westbrook 26,376,773 12,832,092 13,544,681 
    
Waterville 15,106,710 6,198,476 8,908,234 
    
Windham 17,970,916 10,010,329 7,960,587 
    
Gorham 16,283,603 9,363,240 6,920,363 
    
 
Source: Maine Revenue Services and authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4 
Decreases in Full-State Value Tax Rates for  
Residential Real Estate under the Property Tax Cap  
 
 2003 Full-State Value   
 Tax Rate for Post-Initiative % Decrease in 
Municipality Residential Real Estate * Tax Rate Tax Rate 
    
Portland 1.82% 1.30% 28.62% 
    
Lewiston 2.19% 1.41% 35.51% 
    
Bangor 2.08% 1.12% 46.20% 
    
South Portland 1.38% 1.11% 19.99% 
    
Auburn 2.03% 1.13% 44.08% 
    
Brunswick 1.66% 1.10% 33.41% 
    
Biddeford 1.36% 1.09% 19.59% 
    
Sanford 1.51% 1.13% 25.42% 
    
Augusta 2.10% 1.31% 37.61% 
    
Scarborough 1.42% 1.37% 2.92% 
    
Saco 1.31% 1.20% 8.48% 
    
Westbrook 1.53% 1.11% 27.34% 
    
Waterville 2.58% 1.13% 56.03% 
    
Windham 1.40% 1.09% 21.91% 
    
Gorham 1.63% 1.28% 21.67% 
    
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
* Entries in bold type were calculated using average ratios from the 2005 Equalized State 
Valuation, while the other entries were calculated using average ratios from the 2004 
Equalized State Valuation.  Average ratios from the 2005 Equalized State Valuation are 
currently available for 311 of the 472 municipalities included in the analysis.  If the 
average ratios change between the 2004 and 2005 Equalized State Valuations in the other 
161 municipalities, the full-state value tax rates will change as well. 
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Table 5 
Estimated Decrease in Taxes Paid on Residential Real Estate under the Property Tax Cap
 
 2003 Property Taxes under the Decrease in
Municipality Taxes * Property Tax Cap * Taxes 
    
Portland 2,734 1,951 783 
    
Lewiston 3,282 2,117 1,165 
    
Bangor 3,117 1,677 1,440 
    
South Portland 2,073 1,658 415 
    
Auburn 3,041 1,700 1,341 
    
Brunswick 2,483 1,653 830 
    
Biddeford 2,042 1,642 400 
    
Sanford 2,266 1,690 576 
    
Augusta 3,154 1,967 1,187 
    
Scarborough 2,123 2,061 62 
    
Saco 1,963 1,797 166 
    
Westbrook 2,290 1,664 626 
    
Waterville 3,863 1,699 2,164 
    
Windham 2,102 1,641 461 
    
Gorham 2,444 1,915 529 
    
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
* Values are the estimated taxes paid by an individual who built or purchased a home 
valued at $150,000 in 2003. 
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Table 6 
Increases in Full-State Value Tax Rates for 
Residential Real Estate under the Property Tax Cap 
 
 2003 Full-State Value   
 Tax Rate for Post-Initiative % Increase in
Municipality Residential Real Estate * Tax Rate Tax Rate 
    
Alfred 0.97% 1.06% 8.78% 
    
Amherst 0.81% 1.02% 25.72% 
    
Arrowsic 0.79% 1.03% 30.28% 
    
Arundel 0.97% 1.06% 9.61% 
    
Bar Harbor 1.00% 1.01% 1.58% 
    
Beaver Cove 0.40% 0.65% 64.84% 
    
Beddington 0.43% 0.65% 50.56% 
    
Belmont 0.81% 1.03% 27.05% 
    
Blue Hill 0.95% 1.03% 8.88% 
    
Boothbay 1.04% 1.07% 2.40% 
    
Bowerbank 0.34% 0.45% 32.67% 
    
Bremen 0.84% 1.03% 22.01% 
    
Brighton Plantation 0.99% 1.04% 4.87% 
    
Bristol 0.54% 0.96% 79.66% 
    
Brooklin 0.71% 1.00% 40.13% 
    
Brooksville 0.66% 0.94% 41.96% 
    
Buxton 0.93% 1.07% 14.35% 
    
Carrabassett Valley 0.60% 0.81% 34.73% 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 6 
Continued 
 
 2003 Full-State Value   
 Tax Rate for Post-Initiative % Increase in
Municipality Residential Real Estate * Tax Rate Tax Rate 
    
Castine 0.87% 1.03% 18.02% 
    
Centerville 0.85% 1.03% 20.68% 
    
Cushing 0.88% 1.03% 17.73% 
    
Dallas Plantation 0.65% 0.98% 51.35% 
    
Deblois 0.56% 0.80% 42.20% 
    
Deer Isle 0.90% 1.03% 14.54% 
    
Dennistown Plantation 0.60% 0.67% 10.67% 
    
Dixmont 1.12% 1.17% 4.19% 
    
Embden 0.92% 1.00% 9.27% 
    
Frenchboro 1.39% 1.40% 0.25% 
    
Garfield Plantation 0.17% 0.21% 20.83% 
    
Georgetown 0.73% 1.03% 41.16% 
    
Grand Lake Stream  0.96% 1.02% 7.19% 
    
Great Pond 0.90% 1.00% 10.98% 
    
Hancock 0.91% 1.03% 13.47% 
    
Harpswell 0.70% 1.04% 49.33% 
    
Highland Plantation 0.91% 1.03% 13.22% 
    
Islesboro 0.83% 1.00% 20.73% 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 6 
Continued 
 
 2003 Full-State Value   
 Tax Rate for Post-Initiative % Increase in
Municipality Residential Real Estate * Tax Rate Tax Rate 
    
Kennebunkport 0.92% 1.48% 60.87% 
    
Lake View Plantation 0.34% 0.52% 50.60% 
    
Lakeville 0.30% 0.62% 103.63% 
    
Lamoine 0.94% 1.00% 6.61% 
    
Lovell 0.95% 1.00% 5.44% 
    
Lyman 0.85% 1.03% 20.97% 
    
Macwahoc Plantation 0.86% 0.97% 12.74% 
    
Magalloway 
Plantation 0.71% 0.80% 12.10% 
    
Matinicus Isle 
Plantation 0.54% 0.88% 62.15% 
    
Monhegan 0.60% 0.89% 48.93% 
    
Mount Desert 0.72% 1.08% 51.27% 
    
Nashville Plantation 0.66% 0.67% 1.30% 
    
Newfield 0.74% 1.00% 35.23% 
    
Newry 0.84% 1.00% 19.30% 
    
North Berwick 0.99% 1.01% 2.28% 
    
North Haven 0.74% 1.03% 39.37% 
    
Northfield 0.83% 0.94% 12.31% 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 6 
Continued 
 
 2003 Full-State Value   
 Tax Rate for Post-Initiative % Increase in
Municipality Residential Real Estate * Tax Rate Tax Rate 
    
Ogunquit 0.69% 1.14% 63.48% 
    
Otis 0.92% 1.00% 8.93% 
    
Penobscot 0.99% 1.00% 0.52% 
    
Phippsburg 0.93% 1.06% 14.77% 
    
Rangeley Plantation 0.31% 0.54% 76.89% 
    
Robbinston 0.95% 1.03% 8.32% 
    
Rockport 0.97% 1.06% 8.92% 
    
Roque Bluffs 0.77% 1.00% 30.27% 
    
Sandy River Plantation 0.57% 0.82% 42.39% 
    
Sebec 0.97% 1.00% 2.98% 
    
Shapleigh 0.82% 1.00% 22.10% 
    
Sidney 0.94% 1.09% 15.29% 
    
South Bristol 0.52% 0.74% 41.53% 
    
Southport 0.58% 0.72% 24.48% 
    
Southwest Harbor 1.01% 1.09% 7.22% 
    
Steuben 0.97% 1.07% 10.20% 
    
Surry 1.01% 1.01% 0.14% 
    
Tremont 0.76% 1.03% 36.70% 
    
Upton 0.82% 0.99% 20.45% 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
Effects of One-Percent Property Tax Cap 
 31
Table 6 
Continued 
 
 2003 Full-State Value   
 Tax Rate for Post-Initiative % Increase in
Municipality Residential Real Estate * Tax Rate Tax Rate 
    
Verona 0.88% 1.02% 16.75% 
    
Vinalhaven 0.92% 1.06% 15.16% 
    
Waldo 1.02% 1.03% 1.02% 
    
Wells 0.87% 1.01% 16.15% 
    
Westmanland 0.98% 1.00% 2.08% 
    
Whiting 0.73% 1.09% 49.25% 
    
Willimantic 0.70% 1.01% 43.87% 
    
Winter Harbor 0.88% 1.02% 15.42% 
    
York 0.88% 1.01% 14.50% 
    
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
* Entries in bold type were calculated using average ratios from the 2005 Equalized State 
Valuation, while the other entries were calculated using average ratios from the 2004 
Equalized State Valuation.  Average ratios from the 2005 Equalized State Valuation are 
currently available for 311 of the 472 municipalities included in the analysis.  If the 
average ratios change between the 2004 and 2005 Equalized State Valuations in the other 
161 municipalities, the full-state value tax rates will change as well. 
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Table 7 
Estimated Increase in Taxes Paid on Residential Real Estate under the Property Tax Cap 
 
 2003 Property Taxes under the Increase in 
Municipality Taxes * Property Tax Cap * Taxes 
    
Alfred 1,462 1,591 129 
    
Amherst 1,220 1,534 314 
    
Arrowsic 1,184 1,542 358 
    
Arundel 1,455 1,595 140 
    
Bar Harbor 1,494 1,518 24 
    
Beaver Cove 594 979 385 
    
Beddington 643 969 326 
    
Belmont 1,216 1,545 329 
    
Blue Hill 1,419 1,545 126 
    
Boothbay 1,561 1,599 38 
    
Bowerbank 505 670 165 
    
Bremen 1,262 1,540 278 
    
Brighton Plantation 1,490 1,563 73 
    
Bristol 806 1,447 641 
    
Brooklin 1,070 1,500 430 
    
Brooksville 989 1,405 416 
    
Buxton 1,402 1,603 201 
    
Carrabassett Valley 898 1,210 312 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 7 
Continued 
 
 2003 Property Taxes under the Increase in 
Municipality Taxes * Property Tax Cap * Taxes 
    
Castine 1,311 1,547 236 
    
Centerville 1,276 1,540 264 
    
Cushing 1,318 1,551 233 
    
Dallas Plantation 969 1,467 498 
    
Deblois 842 1,198 356 
    
Deer Isle 1,351 1,548 197 
    
Dennistown Plantation 907 1,003 96 
    
Dixmont 1,685 1,755 70 
    
Embden 1,373 1,500 127 
    
Frenchboro 2,088 2,093 5 
    
Garfield Plantation 261 315 54 
    
Georgetown 1,094 1,544 450 
    
Grand Lake Stream  1,433 1,536 103 
    
Great Pond 1,352 1,500 148 
    
Hancock 1,363 1,547 184 
    
Harpswell 1,043 1,558 515 
    
Highland Plantation 1,360 1,540 180 
    
Islesboro 1,242 1,500 258 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 7 
Continued 
 
 2003 Property Taxes under the Increase in 
Municipality Taxes * Property Tax Cap * Taxes 
    
Kennebunkport 1,383 2,225 842 
    
Lake View Plantation 515 775 260 
    
Lakeville 455 927 472 
    
Lamoine 1,407 1,500 93 
    
Lovell 1,426 1,504 78 
    
Lyman 1,277 1,545 268 
    
Macwahoc Plantation 1,287 1,451 164 
    
Magalloway Plantation 1,065 1,194 129 
    
Matinicus Isle Plantation 810 1,314 504 
    
Monhegan 900 1,340 440 
    
Mount Desert 1,075 1,627 552 
    
Nashville Plantation 985 998 13 
    
Newfield 1,109 1,500 391 
    
Newry 1,257 1,500 243 
    
North Berwick 1,485 1,519 34 
    
North Haven 1,111 1,548 437 
    
Northfield 1,249 1,403 154 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 7 
Continued 
 
 2003 Property Taxes under the Increase in 
Municipality Taxes * Property Tax Cap * Taxes 
    
Ogunquit 1,042 1,704 662 
    
Otis 1,377 1,500 123 
    
Penobscot 1,492 1,500 8 
    
Phippsburg 1,388 1,593 205 
    
Rangeley Plantation 460 814 354 
    
Robbinston 1,423 1,542 119 
    
Rockport 1,462 1,592 130 
    
Roque Bluffs 1,151 1,500 349 
    
Sandy River Plantation 861 1,226 365 
    
Sebec 1,457 1,500 43 
    
Shapleigh 1,228 1,500 272 
    
Sidney 1,416 1,633 217 
    
South Bristol 787 1,115 328 
    
Southport 869 1,081 212 
    
Southwest Harbor 1,521 1,631 110 
    
Steuben 1,451 1,599 148 
    
Surry 1,512 1,514 2 
    
Tremont 1,135 1,552 417 
    
Upton 1,230 1,481 251 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 7 
Continued 
 
 2003 Property Taxes under the Increase in 
Municipality Taxes * Property Tax Cap * Taxes 
    
Verona 1,315 1,536 221 
    
Vinalhaven 1,383 1,593 210 
    
Waldo 1,530 1,546 16 
    
Wells 1,306 1,517 211 
    
Westmanland 1,469 1,500 31 
    
Whiting 1,098 1,639 541 
    
Willimantic 1,055 1,517 462 
    
Winter Harbor 1,325 1,529 204 
    
York 1,324 1,516 192 
    
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
* Values are the estimated taxes paid by an individual who built or purchased a home 
valued at $150,000 in 2003. 
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Table 8 
Characteristics of Municipalities with Increases in the  
Full-State Value Tax Rate for Residential Real Estate 
 
 Median 2000 Median 2000 % of Movers 
Municipality Household Income Housing Value from Maine * 
    
Alfred 40,583 113,600 74.81% 
    
Amherst 26,042 65,000 84.13% 
    
Arrowsic 53,250 138,900 76.09% 
    
Arundel 49,484 130,000 70.74% 
    
Bar Harbor 37,481 143,100 60.33% 
    
Beaver Cove 23,500 115,800 NA 
    
Beddington 24,375 81,000 NA 
    
Belmont 29,013 82,900 67.35% 
    
Blue Hill 31,484 153,900 71.13% 
    
Boothbay 41,406 145,500 66.67% 
    
Bowerbank 27,917 85,000 NA 
    
Bremen 36,167 132,900 87.55% 
    
Brighton Plantation 27,083 26,300 NA 
    
Bristol 38,400 128,800 69.35% 
    
Brooklin 36,786 115,300 57.78% 
    
Brooksville 36,458 109,200 63.44% 
    
Buxton 48,958 113,000 86.62% 
    
Carrabassett Valley 45,357 119,100 70.81% 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 8 
Continued 
 
 Median 2000 Median 2000 % of Movers 
Municipality Household Income Housing Value from Maine * 
    
Castine 46,250 229,000 51.07% 
    
Centerville 26,458 65,000 NA 
    
Cushing 40,598 115,700 81.01% 
    
Dallas Plantation 36,875 98,300 73.91% 
    
Deblois 18,750 40,000 NA 
    
Deer Isle 32,826 109,300 63.36% 
    
Dennistown Plantation 85,889 95,000 NA 
    
Dixmont 33,654 75,200 82.65% 
    
Embden 31,397 85,600 75.00% 
    
Frenchboro 38,125 137,500 NA 
    
Garfield Plantation 31,250 67,500 NA 
    
Georgetown 47,813 155,200 67.16% 
    
Grand Lake Stream  28,750 82,500 NA 
    
Great Pond 32,083 83,000 NA 
    
Hancock 32,778 98,100 75.78% 
    
Harpswell 40,611 162,500 50.87% 
    
Highland Plantation 27,917 95,000 NA 
    
Islesboro 39,643 139,000 72.25% 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 8 
Continued 
 
 Median 2000 Median 2000 % of Movers 
Municipality Household Income Housing Value from Maine * 
    
Kennebunkport 54,219 240,700 53.28% 
    
Lake View Plantation 18,125 102,800 NA 
    
Lakeville 15,625 56,700 NA 
    
Lamoine 39,783 102,900 78.18% 
    
Lovell 33,365 99,100 55.02% 
    
Lyman 47,860 111,700 76.09% 
    
Macwahoc Plantation 23,750 24,000 NA 
    
Magalloway Plantation 33,750 85,800 NA 
    
Matinicus Isle Plantation 32,500 60,000 NA 
    
Monhegan 26,250 166,700 NA 
    
Mount Desert 41,321 189,300 71.50% 
    
Nashville Plantation 36,875 95,000 NA 
    
Newfield 38,654 92,500 66.60% 
    
Newry 42,321 110,400 58.39% 
    
North Berwick 46,883 108,400 63.94% 
    
North Haven 40,446 152,800 83.54% 
    
Northfield 36,250 108,300 45.45% 
    
Ogunquit 47,727 208,600 37.99% 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 8 
Continued 
 
 Median 2000 Median 2000 % of Movers 
Municipality Household Income Housing Value from Maine * 
    
Otis 36,250 98,200 74.32% 
    
Penobscot 37,232 90,400 77.71% 
    
Phippsburg 46,739 131,100 66.67% 
    
Rangeley Plantation 34,167 172,900 50.98% 
    
Robbinston 33,250 56,500 72.97% 
    
Rockport 47,155 171,900 68.78% 
    
Roque Bluffs 21,500 91,100 50.67% 
    
Sandy River Plantation 31,875 85,000 NA 
    
Sebec 33,125 79,400 91.12% 
    
Shapleigh 42,026 109,500 71.95% 
    
Sidney 42,500 97,900 87.78% 
    
South Bristol 38,636 144,600 62.89% 
    
Southport 38,125 231,700 61.78% 
    
Southwest Harbor 36,555 121,600 58.12% 
    
Steuben 25,208 66,700 65.96% 
    
Surry 36,932 103,500 69.40% 
    
Tremont 36,750 123,400 70.24% 
    
Upton 35,000 100,000 NA 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 8 
Continued 
 
 Median 2000 Median 2000 % of Movers 
Municipality Household Income Housing Value from Maine * 
    
Verona 41,827 78,400 81.21% 
    
Vinalhaven 34,087 115,800 80.54% 
    
Waldo 29,063 81,300 93.82% 
    
Wells 46,314 151,200 58.97% 
    
Westmanland 30,750 72,500 NA 
    
Whiting 28,304 82,800 81.63% 
    
Willimantic 26,250 47,200 86.11% 
    
Winter Harbor 28,571 84,700 42.76% 
    
York 56,171 190,500 46.16% 
    
 
Source: U.S. Census. 
 
* NA denotes that less than 50 residents moved between 1995 and 2000. 
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Table 9 
Increases in Full-State Value Tax Rates for 
Personal Property under the Property Tax Cap 
 
 2003 Full-State Value   
 Tax Rate for Post-Initiative % Increase in
Municipality Personal Property * Tax Rate Tax Rate 
    
Alfred 0.97% 1.06% 8.78% 
    
Amherst 0.81% 1.02% 25.72% 
    
Arundel 0.97% 1.06% 9.61% 
    
Bar Harbor 1.01% 1.01% 0.37% 
    
Beaver Cove 0.40% 0.65% 64.84% 
    
Belmont 0.81% 1.03% 27.05% 
    
Blue Hill 0.95% 1.03% 8.88% 
    
Boothbay 1.04% 1.07% 2.40% 
    
Brighton Plantation 0.99% 1.04% 4.87% 
    
Bristol 0.54% 0.96% 79.66% 
    
Brooklin 0.71% 1.00% 40.13% 
    
Brooksville 0.66% 0.94% 41.96% 
    
Buxton 0.93% 1.07% 14.35% 
    
Carrabassett Valley 0.61% 0.81% 31.70% 
    
Castine 0.87% 1.03% 18.02% 
    
Deblois 0.56% 0.80% 42.20% 
    
Deer Isle 0.90% 1.03% 14.54% 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 9 
Continued 
 
 2003 Full-State Value   
 Tax Rate for Post-Initiative % Increase in
Municipality Personal Property * Tax Rate Tax Rate 
    
Dixmont 1.12% 1.17% 4.19% 
    
Frenchboro 1.39% 1.40% 0.25% 
    
Garfield Plantation 0.17% 0.21% 20.83% 
    
Gouldsboro 0.99% 1.03% 4.38% 
    
Grand Lake Stream  0.96% 1.02% 7.19% 
    
Hancock 0.91% 1.03% 13.47% 
    
Harpswell 0.69% 1.04% 51.38% 
    
Islesboro 0.83% 1.00% 20.73% 
    
Kennebunkport 0.85% 1.48% 74.00% 
    
Lamoine 0.94% 1.00% 6.61% 
    
Lovell 0.87% 1.00% 14.74% 
    
Lyman 0.85% 1.03% 20.97% 
    
Macwahoc Plantation 0.86% 0.97% 12.74% 
    
Magalloway Plantation 0.71% 0.80% 12.10% 
    
Matinicus Isle Plantation 0.54% 0.88% 62.15% 
    
Monhegan 0.60% 0.89% 48.93% 
    
Mount Desert 0.72% 1.08% 51.27% 
    
Nashville Plantation 0.66% 0.67% 1.30% 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 9 
Continued 
 
 2003 Full-State Value   
 Tax Rate for Post-Initiative % Increase in
Municipality Personal Property * Tax Rate Tax Rate 
    
Newfield 0.74% 1.00% 35.23% 
    
Nobleboro 1.01% 1.04% 2.55% 
    
North Berwick 0.99% 1.01% 2.28% 
    
North Haven 0.74% 1.03% 39.37% 
    
Northfield 0.83% 0.94% 12.31% 
    
Ogunquit 0.75% 1.14% 52.20% 
    
Otis 0.92% 1.00% 8.93% 
    
Penobscot 0.99% 1.00% 0.52% 
    
Phippsburg 0.93% 1.06% 14.77% 
    
Robbinston 0.95% 1.03% 8.32% 
    
Rockport 0.97% 1.06% 8.92% 
    
Sandy River Plantation 0.57% 0.82% 42.39% 
    
Sebec 0.97% 1.00% 2.98% 
    
Sidney 0.93% 1.09% 16.94% 
    
South Bristol 0.52% 0.74% 41.53% 
    
Southport 0.48% 0.72% 51.16% 
    
Southwest Harbor 1.01% 1.09% 7.22% 
    
Stoneham 0.90% 1.02% 13.27% 
    
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 9 
Continued 
 
 2003 Full-State Value   
 Tax Rate for Post-Initiative % Increase in
Municipality Personal Property * Tax Rate Tax Rate 
    
Surry 1.01% 1.01% 0.14% 
    
Tremont 0.76% 1.03% 36.70% 
    
Upton 0.82% 0.99% 20.45% 
    
Verona 0.88% 1.02% 16.75% 
    
Vinalhaven 0.92% 1.06% 15.16% 
    
Waldo 1.02% 1.03% 1.02% 
    
Wells 0.89% 1.01% 13.35% 
    
West Bath 0.91% 1.00% 9.50% 
    
Whiting 0.73% 1.09% 49.25% 
    
Willimantic 0.70% 1.01% 43.87% 
    
Winter Harbor 0.88% 1.02% 15.42% 
    
York 0.88% 1.01% 14.50% 
    
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
* Entries in bold type were calculated using average ratios from the 2005 Equalized State 
Valuation, while the other entries were calculated using average ratios from the 2004 
Equalized State Valuation.  Average ratios from the 2005 Equalized State Valuation are 
currently available for 311 of the 472 municipalities included in the analysis.  If the 
average ratios change between the 2004 and 2005 Equalized State Valuations in the other 
161 municipalities, the full-state value tax rates will change as well. 
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Table 10 
Estimated Increase in Taxes Paid on Personal Property under the Property Tax Cap 
 
 2003 Full-State    
 Value of Personal 2003 Property Taxes under the Increase in 
Municipality Property Taxes  Property Tax Cap Taxes 
     
Alfred 3,312,522 32,297 35,133 2,836 
     
Amherst 190,824 1,553 1,952 399 
     
Arundel 6,776,238 65,743 72,061 6,318 
     
Bar Harbor 12,836,407 129,391 129,866 475 
     
Beaver Cove 103,838 411 678 267 
     
Belmont 986,222 7,995 10,157 2,162 
     
Blue Hill 4,286,989 40,555 44,155 3,600 
     
Boothbay 5,347,510 55,660 56,998 1,338 
     
Brighton 
Plantation 365,815 3,634 3,811 177 
     
Bristol 7,126,068 38,274 68,765 30,491 
     
Brooklin 1,608,239 11,476 16,082 4,606 
     
Brooksville 38,621 255 362 107 
     
Buxton 6,539,545 61,106 69,873 8,767 
     
Carrabassett 
Valley 13,134,824 80,481 105,993 25,512 
     
Castine 1,309,368 11,444 13,506 2,062 
     
Deblois 10,071,188 56,560 80,429 23,869 
     
Deer Isle 327,101 2,947 3,376 429 
     
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 10 
Continued 
 
 2003 Full-State    
 Value of Personal 2003 Property Taxes under the Increase in 
Municipality Property Taxes  Property Tax Cap Taxes 
     
Dixmont 1,659,784 18,643 19,423 780 
     
Frenchboro 757,184 10,540 10,567 27 
     
Garfield 
Plantation 706,107 1,228 1,484 256 
     
Gouldsboro 6,462,605 63,864 66,662 2,798 
     
Grand Lake 
Stream  33,166 317 340 23 
     
Hancock 6,658,732 60,518 68,669 8,151 
     
Harpswell 4,945,831 33,938 51,375 17,437 
     
Islesboro 758,069 6,279 7,581 1,302 
     
Kennebunkport 3,479,488 29,666 51,620 21,954 
     
Lamoine 1,750,004 16,415 17,500 1,085 
     
Lovell 3,645,506 31,854 36,550 4,696 
     
Lyman 3,544,522 30,178 36,507 6,329 
     
Macwahoc 
Plantation 424,058 3,638 4,102 464 
     
Magalloway 
Plantation 25,844 183 206 23 
     
Matinicus Isle 
Plantation 98,239 531 860 329 
     
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 10 
Continued 
 
 2003 Full-State    
 Value of Personal 2003 Property Taxes under the Increase in
Municipality Property Taxes  Property Tax Cap Taxes 
     
Monhegan 83,465 501 746 245 
     
Mount Desert 4,597,837 32,960 49,857 16,897 
     
Nashville 
Plantation 14,080,294 92,451 93,648 1,197 
     
Newfield 224,820 1,663 2,248 585 
     
Nobleboro 1,751,260 17,704 18,156 452 
     
North Berwick 133,655,166 1,322,890 1,353,059 30,169 
     
North Haven 860,376 6,370 8,878 2,508 
     
Northfield 180,748 1,505 1,690 185 
     
Ogunquit 11,594,416 86,548 131,727 45,179 
     
Otis 187,866 1,725 1,879 154 
     
Penobscot 239,313 2,381 2,393 12 
     
Phippsburg 2,402,088 22,232 25,516 3,284 
     
Robbinston 232,624 2,208 2,391 183 
     
Rockport 24,750,614 241,210 262,716 21,506 
     
Sandy River 
Plantation 1,021,279 5,864 8,350 2,486 
     
Sebec 641,742 6,232 6,417 185 
     
Table is continued on the following page. 
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Table 10 
Continued 
 
 2003 Full-State    
 Value of Personal 2003 Property Taxes under the Increase in 
Municipality Property Taxes  Property Tax Cap Taxes 
     
Sidney 4,770,914 44,417 51,942 7,525 
     
South Bristol 1,112,242 5,839 8,264 2,425 
     
Southport 846,834 4,039 6,105 2,066 
     
Southwest Harbor 7,166,086 72,664 77,907 5,243 
     
Stoneham 45,865 415 470 55 
     
Surry 1,043,262 10,516 10,531 15 
     
Tremont 1,370,376 10,371 14,177 3,806 
     
Upton 70,509 578 696 118 
     
Verona 31,939 280 327 47 
     
Vinalhaven 2,012,917 18,563 21,378 2,815 
     
Waldo 343,260 3,501 3,537 36 
     
Wells 58,692,083 523,681 593,585 69,904 
     
West Bath 5,356,897 48,921 53,569 4,648 
     
Whiting 238,958 1,749 2,611 862 
     
Willimantic 216,153 1,520 2,186 666 
     
Winter Harbor 748,157 6,608 7,627 1,019 
     
York 19,193,997 169,425 193,986 24,561 
     
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 11 
Hypothetical 2003 Municipal Expenditures on Local Public Services 
 
  Hypothetical  Hypothetical  
 Estimated 2003 Expenditures under Expenditures under 
Category Expenditures MMA Bill MMA Bill and Tax Cap 
    
K-12 Education 991,204,911 806,813,277 835,702,512 
    
General 
Administration 123,409,127 123,409,127 37,716,867 
    
Law Enforcement 122,685,148 122,685,148 37,495,601 
    
Fire Protection 85,655,240 85,655,240 26,178,350 
    
Emergency Medical 
Services 19,307,374 19,307,374 5,900,809 
    
Roads – Winter 
Maintenance 48,164,169 48,164,169 14,720,156 
    
Roads – Other 113,125,729 113,125,729 34,574,008 
    
Solid Waste & 
Recycling 85,719,210 85,719,210 26,197,901 
    
General Assistance 10,453,706 10,453,706 3,194,910 
    
Social Service 
Programs 4,335,262 4,335,262 1,324,963 
    
Parks & Recreation 36,127,818 36,127,818 11,041,551 
    
Libraries 24,290,021 24,290,021 7,423,628 
    
County Taxes 90,771,654 90,771,654 90,771,654 
    
Debt Service 87,833,020 87,833,020 87,833,020 
    
Other Categories 317,172,295 317,172,295 96,935,661 
    
Total 2,160,254,684 1,975,863,050 1,317,011,591 
    
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 12 
Hypothetical FY 04- 5 Maine General Fund Appropriations  
 
  Hypothetical Appropriations 
Expenditure Category Baseline * under MMA Bill *
   
Department of $1,916.2 $2,413.6 
Education & State (36.7%) (46.3%) 
Board of Education   
   
Maine Technical College  $81.9 $69.5 
System (1.6%) (1.3%) 
   
University of Maine  $353.6 $300.3 
System (6.8%) (5.8%) 
   
Other Education $27.1 $23.0 
 (0.5%) (0.4%) 
   
Arts, Heritage & Cultural  $17.8 $15.1 
Enrichment (0.3%) (0.3%) 
   
Economic Development  $95.7 $81.3 
& Work Force Training (1.8%) (1.6%) 
   
Health & Human  $1,580.0 $1,341.9 
Services (30.3%) (25.7%) 
   
Transportation Safety &  $7.7 $6.5 
Development (0.1%) (0.1%) 
   
Justice & Protection $448.0 $380.5 
 (8.6%) (7.3%) 
   
Natural Resources  $145.1 $123.2 
Development & (2.8%) (2.4%) 
Protection   
   
Governmental Support  $544.4 $462.4 
& Operations (10.4%) (8.9%) 
   
Total $5,217.4 $5,217.4 
   
 
Source: State of Maine Budget Website and authors’ calculations.
 
* All values are in 1,000,000s. 
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Table 13 
Hypothetical FY 04- 5 Maine General Fund Appropriations under Property Tax Cap 
 
  Hypothetical Hypothetical 
 Hypothetical Appropriations Appropriations 
 Appropriations under MMA Bill under MMA Bill 
Expenditure Category under Tax Cap * and Tax Cap *,** and Tax Cap *,*** 
    
Department of Education & $1,916.2 $2,355.9 $2,355.9 
State Board of Education (36.7%) (45.2%) (45.2%) 
    
Maine Technical College  $47.8 $44.4 $36.9 
System (0.9%) (0.9%) (0.7%) 
    
University of Maine System $206.3 $191.9  $159.2 
 (4.0%) (3.7%) (3.1%) 
    
Other Education $15.8 $14.7 $12.2 
 (0.3%) (0.3%) (0.2%) 
    
Arts, Heritage & Cultural  $10.4 $9.64   $8.0 
Enrichment (0.2%) (0.2%) (0.2%) 
     
Economic Development  $55.8 $51.9 $43.1 
& Work Force Training (1.1%) (1.1%) (0.8%) 
    
Health & Human Services $921.7 $857.2 $711.2 
 (17.7%) (16.4%) (13.6%) 
     
Transportation Safety &  $4.5 $4.2 $3.5 
Development (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%) 
    
Justice & Protection $261.4 $243.1 $201.7 
 (5.0%) (4.7%) (3.9%) 
    
Natural Resources  $84.7 $78.7 $65.3 
Development & (1.6%) (1.5%) (1.3%) 
Protection    
    
Governmental Support  $317.6 $295.4 $245.1 
& Operations (6.1%) (5.7%) (4.7%) 
    
Subsidies to Municipalities $1,375.5 $1,070.4 $1,375.5 
 (26.4%) (20.5%) (26.4%) 
    
Total $5,217.4 $5,217.4 $5,217.4 
    
 
Source: State of Maine Budget Website and authors’ calculations.
 
* All values are in 1,000,000s. 
** Assumes municipalities use additional funding from the state to reduce local spending. 
*** Assumes municipalities do not make any reductions in expenditures made possible by the passage of 
the MMA bill. 
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Table 14 
Maine General Fund Revenue, FY 2003 
 
   
Revenue Source Amount % of Total 
   
Individual Income Tax 1,071,701,694 44.75% 
   
Sales and Use Tax 857,486,801 35.81% 
   
Cigarette Tax 94,397,943 3.94% 
   
Corporate Income Taxes 91,188,393 3.81% 
   
Insurance Premium Tax 71,078,089 2.97% 
   
Lottery Revenue 39,442,111 1.65% 
   
Estate Tax 30,520,320 1.27% 
   
Telecommunications Personal Property Tax 29,119,156 1.22% 
   
Fines, Forfeits and Penalties 26,993,115 1.13% 
   
Service Charges for Current Services 26,584,849 1.11% 
   
Excise Tax - Spirits 26,073,276 1.09% 
   
Other 30,104,443 1.26% 
   
Total 2,394,690,190 100.00% 
   
 
Source: Maine Office of Fiscal and Program Review 
